> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://bsquarebulletin.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Judge hears arguments in Rokita–Marté ICE detainer fight, decision not expected before Nov. 12 - URL: https://bsquarebulletin.com/judge-hears-arguments-in-rokita-marte-ice-detainer-fight-decision-not-expected-before-nov-12/ - Published: 2026-10-27T18:52:44.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-27T22:11:28.000Z - Description: A ruling is not expected before Nov. 12 in the dispute between Indiana attorney general Todd Rokita and Monroe County sheriff Ruben Marté over ICE detainers. At Tuesday’s hearing, the judge weighed whether county jailers can legally hold people based on the say-so of a federal immigration officer. - Author: Dave Askins - Tags: Local Government, #no-inline-feature ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/6f/206f9007-c0a7-47d4-b87b-686c21961f22/content/images/2026/10/Rokita-and-Marte--2025-05-04-at-7.30.39---PM--2-.jpg) A decision on the last unresolved issue in Indiana attorney general Todd Rokita’s lawsuit against Monroe County sheriff Ruben Marté is not expected before Nov. 12\. That’s how things stand after more than two hours of oral arguments Tuesday (Oct. 27) in Monroe County circuit court. Special judge Luke Rudisill heard competing requests for summary judgment, which is a decision based just on the law and an agreed set of facts. At stake is whether Marté can prohibit sheriff’s deputies from keeping people jailed solely on federal immigration detainers that are not accompanied by criminal judicial warrants. Rudisill gave the two sides until Thursday, Nov. 12, to submit proposed orders. The judge was active during the hearing, at times interrupting attorneys to clarify their positions. Many of his questions circled back to one issue: When federal immigration officers say they have grounds to detain someone, can a county jailer rely on that determination to keep the person in custody? That question involves what’s known as the collective knowledge doctrine, which allows law enforcement officers, under certain circumstances, to rely on information known to other officers. The lawsuit, filed in July 2024, has narrowed considerably. An [August consent decree](https://bsquarebulletin.com/partial-settlement-of-rokita-marte-immigration-fight-but-main-ice-detainer-dispute-remains/) resolved many of the attorney general’s objections to the sheriff’s policy, known as MCSO-012\. The consent decree bars blanket restrictions on deputies communicating or cooperating with federal immigration authorities, but leaves the detainer prohibition unresolved. The issue before Rudisill on Tuesday was Section 4 of [Indiana Code 5-2-18.2](https://iga.in.gov/laws/2026/ic/titles/5#5-2-18.2). It prohibits local governments from restricting the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than what federal law permits, whether the enforcement is carried out by federal, state or local officers, as long as the enforcement actions do not violate federal or state law. Rokita argues that holding someone on an detainer from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is lawful, so Marté cannot categorically prevent deputies from doing it. Marté argues that keeping a person jailed after the grounds for local custody end, without a criminal judicial warrant, would violate the Fourth Amendment and Indiana’s Constitution. Section 4, he says, cannot require him to permit unconstitutional detentions. That question is distinct from a related dispute already before the Indiana Court of Appeals. A law adopted this spring, Senate Enrolled Act 76, added Section 9, which requires jail authorities to comply with requests in ICE detainers. Such requests typically ask local jails to hold people for up to 48 hours after their scheduled release, so immigration officers can take custody. On June 30, Rudisill issued a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing Section 9, and its detainer-compliance requirement against Marté and his office, while litigation continues. The order was not a final ruling on constitutionality. Rokita appealed the preliminary injunction before the case was finished, which is called an interlocutory appeal. On Aug. 28, the appellate court denied Rokita’s request to suspend the injunction during the appeal, but did not decide the appeal itself. The [Aug. 28 appellate order](https://bloomdocs.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/2026-08-28-53C06-2407-PL-001733-Order-on-request-for-stay-Received-from-the-Court.pdf) reflects that narrower ruling in the appeals case, which is numbered [26A-PL-1737](https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/SearchResults/eyJ2Ijp7Ik1vZGUiOiJCeUNhc2UiLCJDYXNlTnVtIjoiMjZBLVBMLTE3MzciLCJDaXRlTnVtIjpudWxsLCJDcm9zc1JlZk51bSI6bnVsbCwiRmlyc3QiOm51bGwsIk1pZGRsZSI6bnVsbCwiTGFzdCI6bnVsbCwiQnVzaW5lc3MiOm51bGwsIkRvQlN0YXJ0IjpudWxsLCJEb0JFbmQiOm51bGwsIk9BTnVtIjpudWxsLCJCYXJOdW0iOm51bGwsIlNvdW5kRXgiOmZhbHNlLCJDb3VydEl0ZW1JRCI6OTIsIkNhdGVnb3JpZXMiOm51bGwsIkxpbWl0cyI6bnVsbCwiQWR2YW5jZWQiOnRydWUsIkFjdGl2ZUZsYWciOiJBbGwiLCJGaWxlU3RhcnQiOm51bGwsIkZpbGVFbmQiOm51bGwsIkNvdW50eUNvZGUiOm51bGx9fQ==). ### Courtroom arguments about earlier decisions Tuesday’s hearing lasted about two hours and 25 minutes. Blake Lanning, an attorney from Rokita’s office, presented the state’s position. Marté was represented by Alexandra Lichtenstein, of Georgetown University Law Center’s Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, and Monroe County attorney Justin Roddye. Lichtenstein made the sheriff’s presentation. Before presenting, both attorneys moved from tables along the sides of the courtroom to a center table, where they remained seated while addressing the judge. It made for less rhetorical flourish and more measured, at times tedious argumentation, revolving mostly around previous cases, and what those courts actually held. That’s opposed to what subsequent courts said about the holdings, or what the courts might have mentioned in their rulings that was not actually a part of the holding. Rudisill was no passive listener. He interrupted both sides throughout their presentations with questions meant to distill the myriad details into a few key issues. One was whether a federal administrative immigration warrant, which is issued by an immigration official, not a judge, gives enough grounds for a local officer to prolong the detention of somebody already in jail. A related question was whether the constitutional analysis changes because removability from the country under immigration law is a civil matter, not a criminal one. Rudisill also asked the two sides to scrutinize a potential distinction between federal immigration officers and local officers. Does the federal government’s authority to make civil immigration arrests extend to county officers acting at ICE’s request? Does it make a difference whether local officers are operating under a formal 287(g) agreement, through which local personnel receive federal immigration-enforcement authority and training? The judge’s most sustained inquiries concerned the collective knowledge doctrine. In ordinary policing, an officer can sometimes make an arrest based on information another officer possesses, even without personally knowing all the facts establishing probable cause. The question during Tuesday’s hearing was whether that principle works across the boundary between federal civil immigration enforcement and local law enforcement. A Monroe County jailer receiving an ICE detainer generally does not independently investigate ICE’s basis for detention. If the federal officer’s knowledge can legally be attributed to the jailer, that supports Rokita. If the doctrine cannot apply here, or ICE supplies insufficient information, that supports Marté’s constitutional objection. Rudisill pressed the lawyers on whether decisions involving criminal arrests establish a rule for civil immigration detention. Another key question was whether it matters that an ICE officer’s determination is not reviewed by an independent judge. ### What happens at the Monroe County jail? The constitutional dispute between Rokita and Marté does not mean the jail has stopped dealing with ICE. In a response to a B Square public records request followed by a phone interview, jail commander Kyle Gibbons described a routine that involves notifications and, in some cases, arrests by immigration officers at the jail. The request did not result in production of any records. The sheriff’s office withheld some requested records, citing federal confidentiality rules, and said it had no responsive records for other categories. But Gibbons described for The B Square how the Monroe County jail interacts with ICE. Detainer requests arrive by email or fax. Gibbons said fingerprint checks can also alert federal authorities that someone is in custody. The jail acknowledges receipt of retainer requests and notifies ICE when a prisoner is scheduled for release. But that does not mean Monroe County jail holds anyone past their scheduled release time. Under Rudisill’s preliminary injunction, the sheriff’s office says it does not hold anyone past the time they otherwise must be released, just to await the arrival of ICE. When federal immigration officers or an affiliated law-enforcement agency arrive for a release, the jail uses its secure sally port, which is the controlled vehicle-entry area. Gibbons described how county staff release the prisoner when local authority to hold the person ends, and after that immigration authorities then make their own arrest. Gibbons said the sally-port arrangement avoids attempted arrests in public areas that could lead to attempted flight, pursuits or injuries. From January 2026 through the date of the response to the records request, Gibbons said 18 people at the jail had been flagged through some form of immigration-related notice or paperwork. Of those, six were released and then detained by ICE or an affiliated agency. The 18 did not all represent formal ICE detainer requests, and the jail does not track which particular outside agency makes an arrest. So it’s not recorded exactly who made the six arrests. That practice illustrates a key distinction in the lawsuit. The sheriff’s office says it complies with requirements to notify ICE about scheduled releases, but maintains that it cannot be required to keep people in custody beyond their scheduled release times, just on ICE’s say-so. --- At the close of Tuesday’s hearing, Rudisill took both motions for summary judgment on the Section 4 issue under advisement. With proposed orders due Nov. 12, the trial court’s next ruling will address the legality of the sheriff’s remaining detainer restriction. It will not resolve the separate Section 9 dispute, which remains in front of the Indiana Court of Appeals on an interlocutory appeal.