

## Nicole Browne

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**From:** Julie Hardesty <jlhardes@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 23, 2021 1:01 PM  
**To:** Penny Githens  
**Cc:** Julie Thomas; Lee Jones; Nicole Browne  
**Subject:** Re: Expand Voter Services

Hello Commissioner Githens - Thank you for clarifying that you are not in agreement with Clerk Browne and the Election Board's request for space in the Johnson Hardware building for voter services. Regarding your request for a detailed, written proposal for space needs, I will point you to both a literally handwritten document from your Work Session on August 18, 2021

([https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1630351256\\_62955.pdf](https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1630351256_62955.pdf)) that details how the space on both the first floor and the second floor of Johnson Hardware would be used for voter services as well as the documentation from your Work Session on August 25, 2021

([https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1629894050\\_69301.pdf](https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1629894050_69301.pdf)) that provides even more detail and explanation on how the first and second floors of the Johnson Hardware building would be used for voter services and the voter services requirements that this request is fulfilling. The main point is consolidation for storage and security needs surrounding our elections. Satellite voting is also discussed, with Clerk Browne pointing out that it is not an option in this county because the two major Party Chairs will not agree to satellite voting locations for early voting and it is not as secure as having all early voting in a single location.

In reference to the Commissioners asking about using the Monroe County Convention Center space for early voting in 2020 and being told no, I am pretty sure that the no response did not come from the Election Board, it came from the convention center because the space was already booked. I am copying the County Clerk on this message in case I am mistaken on this point.

The County Clerk and the Election Board are not responsible for probation services so it makes no sense that their proposal should require any suggestions on where to move probation services. That seems like your responsibility as Commissioner to figure out.

While other clerks from around the state might be using satellite voting locations, that does not mean we can or should do that in Monroe County. Again, I will point you to the documentation provided by County Clerk Nicole Browne in your Work Session on August 25, 2021 that explains:

"Challenges associated with securing satellite locations, include but are not limited to, HAVA compliance [that is the Help America Vote Act, a federal law specifying mandatory minimum standards for states to follow regarding election administration - see <https://www.eac.gov/about-the-eac/help-america-vote-act.aspx>], equipment security, minimal voter confusion, required bipartisan staffing, compliance costs, pre-election availability and a bipartisan agreement between both major Party Chairs.

Additionally, the Monroe County Election Board and the Monroe County Clerk believe that an additional satellite location would sacrifice the safety, security and integrity of the voted ballot, thus weakening the voting environment. This could also impact turnout."

[https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1629894050\\_69301.pdf](https://www.co.monroe.in.us/egov/documents/1629894050_69301.pdf), p. 5

There is no bipartisan agreement between both major Party Chairs in Monroe County to use satellite voting locations for early voting, thus satellite voting locations are not an option. The request from the County Clerk



and the Election Board is an option. Their request does have bipartisan support from both major Party Chairs. The security and trustworthiness of our upcoming elections is too important to procrastinate any further on what needs to be done regarding space allocation.

Furthermore, those "best practices" you are putting into quotes are, in fact, recommendations that the County Clerk is sharing with you. That is the County Clerk's job and to suggest that those best practices need to be verified is disturbingly disrespectful to the County Clerk's elected position and experience with voter services.

As a citizen and Monroe County resident, I am very distressed at what I see as the Commissioners' lack of acknowledgement for the needs of voter services for elections in Monroe County and the urgency of those needs. The request is there in multiple meetings and to see this Work Session item continue to show up on the Commissioners' meeting agenda is sending me the message that the Commissioners are holding up progress.

Please support the County Clerk's recommendations for space allocation for voter services.

Sincerely,

Juliet Hardesty

421 W. Somersbe Place

Bloomington, IN 47403

On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:31 PM Penny Githens <[pgithens@co.monroe.in.us](mailto:pgithens@co.monroe.in.us)> wrote:

Julie,

No, I am not currently in agreement with the Clerk and the Election Board regarding space in the Johnson Hardware Building. It makes much more sense to me to have satellite voting locations, reducing the need for additional space at Election Central. The Clerk has asked other clerks from around the state to appear at our meetings, and basically all of them utilize satellite early voting. Last year we asked if the Election Board would like to use space at the Convention Center for early voting in 2020 - a space which would have permitted better parking and many more voters inside at any given time - but we told "no." We also made additional space available in the Monroe County Courthouse for processing ballots, but this space was only accessed a handful of times.

While we have heard repeatedly about what are "best practices," we are unable to verify that the requests we have heard are, in fact, best practices.

It is the County Commissioners who are responsible for all space allocations. No one, again in my opinion, has offered a reasonable suggestion for where juvenile and adult probation offices should be moved to if the entire Johnson Hardware building were turned over to the Election Division.

I have asked more than once to have a detailed, written proposal for space needs, including where things are stored now and how much storage space these things currently occupy to help me make my decision. I am still waiting for that proposal.

Penny Githens  
Monroe County Board of Commissioners  
100 W. Kirkwood Ave.  
Bloomington, IN 47404  
812-349-2550

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**From:** Julie Hardesty <jlhardes@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, October 29, 2021 12:45 PM  
**To:** Julie Thomas; Penny Githens; Lee Jones  
**Subject:** Re: Expand Voter Services

Hello Commissioners - Thank you for replying, Commissioner Thomas. This is my understanding of the process happening here:

The last 2 general elections (2016 and 2020) have seen a significant increase in turnout for early voting as well as heightened concerns about ballot storage and security. The County Clerk, the Election Board, and the chairs of the Monroe County Democratic Party and the Monroe County Republican Party have all agreed that expanding voter services (for all needs related to elections and voting) is necessary and it should be done within a single facility. Early voting already occurs in the Johnson Hardware building and the recommendation they all agree on is to expand the space used inside Johnson Hardware to accommodate the expanded storage, office, training, and voting needs for elections, with the next election occurring in 2022. I believe they also recognize that the second floor cannot be used for voting but will allow for expanded secure ballot and equipment storage. This leaves the first floor more open for more voting capacity with additional accessible entrances and exits than are currently available.

The County Commissioners are in charge of facilities in this process and instead of agreeing with the recommendation, you all are suggesting combinations of multiple facilities, thereby holding up the process because using multiple facilities for voter services is not something that anyone else involved in the process is agreeing can occur.

Is my understanding incorrect? Are you all actually in agreement with the recommendation from the County Clerk, Election Board, and party chairs?

Thank you for responding to my questions.  
Sincerely,  
Juliet Hardesty  
421 W. Somersbe Place  
Bloomington, IN 47403

On Wed, Oct 27, 2021 at 1:03 PM Julie Thomas <jthomas@co.monroe.in.us> wrote:



Thanks for writing, Ms. Hardesty!

We appreciate your concerns and we share them.

However, I respectfully disagree with your assessment of our efforts. We have continued to try to work with the Election Board.

The second floor of the Johnson Hardware is NOT for voting, but for the storage of equipment. It will do nothing to help provide voting space.

We continue to work on a short-term AND a long-term solution. We are happy to provide information for you at any time.

We have not ignored any request for space. We have a large number of space needs to consider from a number of departments. The second working group meeting was cancelled this week by the Clerk. So, we are trying to get the next meeting scheduled.

There will be a short-term solution and a long-term solution. We continue to work in good faith and hope that if you have questions you will ask us before making assumptions about the process and our progress.

Thanks-

Julie

Julie L. Thomas  
Monroe County Board of Commissioners  
100 W. Kirkwood Ave.  
Bloomington, IN 47404

812-345-0707

**From:** Julie Hardesty <jlhardes@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 26, 2021 9:22 PM  
**To:** Julie Thomas  
**Cc:** Lee Jones; Penny Githens  
**Subject:** Re: Expand Voter Services

Hello Commissioner Thomas - I have been listening in on the recent meetings involving the County Commissioners, the County Clerk, and the Election Board. While it might be the case that you all as County Commissioners think you are agreeing about the importance of our election systems, your actions speak very differently. You are disregarding that the County Clerk has been asking for expansion of voter services at the Johnson Hardware building since the 2016 General Election, not just since 2020. You are disregarding the fact that in order for multiple buildings to be used for voter services as you all are continuously suggesting, both party chairs have to be in agreement to do this and they are not agreeing to do this. That means what you all are suggesting is not an option. Full stop. The party chairs have both agreed already on expanding the space used at the Johnson Hardware building for voter services and the County Clerk has provided you all with details about doing that expansion. That is the only viable option regardless of any other buildings you all are suggesting because there is no other building combination that both parties are agreeing will work. The County Clerk, the Election Board, and the party chairs are all in agreement. You all as the County Commissioners are holding out in opposition and holding up the process of supporting our rights as voters. The impact of what you are doing is voter suppression, regardless of your intent.

In terms of moving probation services, there are costs for doing this or for using additional buildings for voter services (which, again I will state, is not an option anyway since the party chairs have not agreed to do this). But the costs are more than monetary. I would ask you which is more important - ensuring that everyone in Monroe County is supported in their constitutional right as citizens to vote in open, fair, and accessible elections or ensuring that the county has the ability to collect fines or fees and enforce probation requirements on convicted criminals (who are also citizens with the constitutional right to vote in the state of Indiana when on probation)? I would argue that expanding voter services in a way that is already agreed upon by the party chairs, the County Clerk, and the Election Board, far outweighs the services provided by the probation office. And if there are so many building options that you all think can work for expanding voter services, then surely some of those options are also available for probation services to use. This is exactly where the facilities that you control come into play. You three, as County Commissioners, have the ability to change the use of these facilities to fit with the needs of the county. Those needs right now are to expand voter services at the Johnson Hardware building and locate probation services in a different facility.

You all can do this as the County Commissioners. It is disconcerting to see the three of you ignore what the County Clerk, the Election Board, and the party chairs are agreeing is needed to support our election systems in Monroe County.

Sincerely,  
Juliet Hardesty  
421 W. Somersbe Place  
Bloomington, IN 47403

On Wed, Sep 22, 2021 at 11:10 AM Julie Thomas <jthomas@co.monroe.in.us> wrote:



Thank you for writing, Julie!

Please be assured that the Board of Commissioners agrees with you about the importance of our election system. We will do everything in our power to ensure elections are open, fair, and accessible to every eligible voter!

In 2020, before the pandemic, the Clerk asked the Commissioners to remodel the Johnson Hardware space. We expedited that work, removing half-walls and replacing the flooring as well. At the time we were told by staff that this was all they needed.

Of course, the pandemic changed everything in 2020! We worked with Emergency Management to provide supplies to keep voters safe and we offered a number of spaces in county government buildings, including the entire Nat U Hill meeting room. We went to the expense of installing a dual-ID lock on the door to ensure that a D and an R were BOTH present to access the space. In addition, we offered additional voting space in the County's portion of the Showers Building. This is an accessible space, a large space, and ADA compliant. The County owns the parking lot now, so the previous concerns about parking have been resolved. Neither of these spaces were utilized. It is disheartening to hear that the decision was made to work out of the back of a truck.

After the election, we were informed that more space is needed. In May, we attended the Election Board meeting, seeking a written report from the Board about the space that they need. We asked them to specify how much space was needed for storage, daily use (for example, voter registration), and temporary use (for example, in-person voting, ballot processing, etc.).

We received a written request for the first time at the Commissioners' meeting on August 17th, while Clerk Browne made a presentation.

There is nothing in any of this that contradicts our statement that we fully support our Election Board and that we will do all that we can to ensure elections are fully accessible in our role as the administrator/owner of facility space.

Please note, as well, that facilities (buildings) are the ONLY thing we control. It is up to the Election Board to make additional satellite early voting locations available (they chose not to do so in 2020, despite the long lines of voters). They can also consider vote centers. Please send your concerns to the Election Board as well.

We are eagerly awaiting the Election Board's response to a number of options related to facilities that we offered the Election Board a few weeks ago. We are seeking a long-term solution that will help ensure that voting is accessible to, and convenient for, every eligible resident in Monroe County.

Thank you for your interest!

Julie

Julie L. Thomas  
Monroe County Board of Commissioners  
100 W. Kirkwood Ave.  
Bloomington, IN 47404

812-345-0707

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**From:** Julie Hardesty <jlhardes@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 17, 2021 9:23 AM  
**To:** Julie Thomas  
**Subject:** Expand Voter Services

Dear Commissioner Thomas:

I have been voting in Monroe County for over 20 years, never missing a primary or an election. I have used Early Voting every time it has been available, back when it was in the Curry Building on 7th Street and now in the Johnson Building. I have lived in my current residence for 17 years and I don't even remember the last time I visited my local precinct voting location because I always vote early downtown. I have also never seen anything like the lines that were around the block for early voting in October 2020. I use early voting precisely for the convenience of not needing to stand in line. I can do it on my way into work and not miss any work. That was not the case this past election and I am beyond bewildered about why there is even any sort of debate about expanding the space for Election Central at the Johnson Building.

We have an elected official who is in charge of running our elections, Nicole Browne, the Monroe County Clerk, and she has told you repeatedly that more space is needed. Why would you not want to support increased needs for voting? It took me over an hour to vote on a day that was weeks before Election Day. This may sound like just an inconvenience but the impact of voter inconvenience is voter suppression. And you better believe that anything that might suppress the vote is going to have full support from conservatives like those in charge at the state level right now in Indiana. All you have to do is look at what is happening to inconvenience pregnant people in Texas regarding the choices they make about their bodies and note that Indiana is already looking to implement a similar law here to see that there is little hesitation to inconvenience us out of our rights. If that works as an inconvenience to make it harder for pregnant people to receive safe and legal health care, you can be sure that similar inconveniencing laws will soon follow to suppress the vote as much as possible.

We need to continue to see turnouts like we saw in 2020 for every single election and we need to increase the space available so that anyone who wants to vote can do it. The Monroe County Clerk has told you all how to make it happen. Why is this not being celebrated as a fantastic problem? You all should be welcoming the use of more space to allow more access to vote! This should be an easy thing to support. Increasing voter access helps everyone. You all can be the champions of that if you would support the County Clerk's recommendations.

Sincerely,  
Juliet Hardesty  
421 W. Somersbe Place  
Bloomington, IN 47403



## Nicole Browne

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**From:** Tressia Martin  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 30, 2021 3:57 PM  
**To:** Nicole Browne  
**Subject:** RE: Days In Nat U. Hill

October 5 through October 9  
Oct 12 through Oct 16  
Oct 19 through Oct 23  
Oct 26 through Oct 30

Total of 20 days

**From:** Nicole Browne <nbrowne@co.monroe.in.us>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 24, 2021 9:15 AM  
**To:** Tressia Martin <tmartin@co.monroe.in.us>  
**Subject:** Days In Nat U. Hill

Tree,

Can I please trouble you to tell me how many days the group worked in the Nat U. Hill room during the Presidential election?

Nicole



## Nicole Browne

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**From:** Sherry Morris  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 28, 2021 10:20 AM  
**To:** Nicole Browne  
**Subject:** RE: Square Footage Trivia

I measured the two spaces in the Showers Building that have been used in the past for trainings.

**Training room (Room 100B): 650 sq ft**

... includes 575 sq ft actual space with tables & chairs + 15 sq ft closet space (that I use) + 60 sq ft entry (that I use).

**Election equipment practice room (Room 100A): 265 sq ft**

These spaces have been very crowded, and it is difficult to have the election practice room to be separate from the training room. It is much more efficient and secure to have it all in the same room and have the ability for the room to be locked when not in use (we cannot lock the rooms in Showers).

**From:** Nicole Browne <nbrowne@co.monroe.in.us>  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 28, 2021 7:58 AM  
**To:** Sherry Morris <smorris@co.monroe.in.us>  
**Subject:** Square Footage Trivia


Ms. Sherry,

Would you have an approximate idea of the square footage of 100B, the classroom where you used to do poll worker training?

If not, it's okay...I'm just trying to figure out the easiest way to get that information.

Thank you.

Nicole



**monroe convention center**  
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA

Invoice #  
E14483

Client/Organizator	Monroe County Clerk's Office	Event Date	10/31/2020 (Sat)
Booking Contact	Sherry Morris	Invoice Due Date	12/3/2020
Address	P.O. Box 547	PO #	
City, St/Prov Posta	Bloomington, IN 47402		

**Food/Service Items**

Food/Service Items	Qty	Price	Total
Room Rental 17 Days @ \$150.00			

Room Chg	\$2,550.00
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	Food	Beverage	Liquor	Equipment	Labor	Room	Other	Total
Subtotal	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$2,550.00	\$0.00	\$2,550.00
Taxes	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Total	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$2,550.00	\$0.00	\$2,550.00

**Please make payments payable to the "Monroe Convention Center".  
1.5% per month will be added to any balance due in excess of 30 days.  
Additional 4% charge for credit card payments.**



002744 MONROE CONVENTION

Bank: 001


Check Date: 11/18/2020 Check: **273801**

PO

Budget Account Code	Invoice Date	Invoice
1215.30006.000.0062	10/31/2020	E14483

Comment  
EB2020-112

Amount
2,550.00
<u>2,550.00</u>



273801

11/18/2020

Pay exactly Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and No/100 dollars

\$2,550.00

MONROE CONVENTION  
 CENTER  
 302 S COLLEGE AVE  
 BLOOMINGTON IN 47403-1509

**Copy**  
**Non-negotiable**

**Karen Wheeler**  
**Monroe County Election Supervisor**  
**401 W 7<sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 100**  
**Bloomington, IN 47404**

August 23, 2021

To the best of my remembrance, this is what happened when the commissioners decided to renovate Election Central.

Several people came down to Election Central to discuss how the renovation would take place. Since I did not know that these decisions were going to be made that day, I was surprised. Together we made suggestions and came up with a plan. Angie Purdie and Jeff Cockrell were a part of this. This would have been in the first part of January 2020.


I'm sure I said this will be great! And it was great. It opened up Election Central in a most positive way. What I didn't say was that this is all that we needed.

On that day of decision, the back room was filled with voting equipment, wall-to-wall. No one on that day knew where that equipment would go. Jeff Cockrell agreed to check into finding a place for the equipment. To say this is all the space we would need but not knowing where our equipment would be stored does not make sense. It was a great improvement but that is not the same as this is all we need.

The next workday, I thought of another additional improvement, moving a short half wall. It would cost \$1,000 more. I was told that I would get what I had asked for the day before and no more. No changes. What was talked about on the original day is what happened, no more.

Later we rented a storage unit on the other side of Ellettsville for voting signs, ramps, and anything else that didn't need to be in a climate-controlled room. Our voting equipment was moved to the Shower's room, which had previously contained the signs, ramps, etc. Our back room was converted to office workspace for mailed ballots, military and overseas, and storage.

Sincerely,



Karen Wheeler



003742 BOUNDS FLOORING, INC

Bank: 001

Check Date: 02/26/2020

Check: **268001**

PO

Budget Account Code	Invoice Date	Invoice
1215.30006.000.0062	02/06/2020	MK184146

Comment  
CLERK

Amount
17,545.30
<u>17,545.30</u>

*Clerk  
election  
Budget*

268001

02/26/2020

Pay exactly Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred Forty Five and 30/100 dollars

\$17,545.30

BOUNDS FLOORING, INC  
5005 N STATE RD 37 BUSINESS  
Bloomington IN 47404

**Copy  
Non-negotiable**

001427 Weddle Bros. Building

Bank: 001

Check Date: 05/26/2021

Check: 278719

PO	Budget Account Code	Invoice Date	Invoice	Comment	Amount
	1215.30006.000.0062	03/30/2020	101269	EB2021-009	20,000.00
					<u>20,000.00</u>

*Client Election Budget*

278719

05/26/2021

Pay exactly Twenty Thousand and No/100 dollars

\$20,000.00

Weddle Bros. Building  
Group, LLC  
PO Box 1330  
Bloomington IN 47402-1330

**Copy  
Non-negotiable**



004170 ELITE ELECTRIC, LLC

Bank: 001

Check Date: 05/26/2021

Check: **278716**

PO	Budget Account Code	Invoice Date	Invoice	Comment	Amount
	1215.30006.000.0062	05/13/2021	2802	EB2021-010	2,000.00
					<u>2,000.00</u>

*Clerk  
Election  
Budget*

278716

05/26/2021

Pay exactly Two Thousand and No/100 dollars

\$2,000.00

ELITE ELECTRIC, LLC  
2518 PATRICKSBURG RD  
Spencer IN 47460

**Copy  
Non-negotiable**

## CHAPTER 3

# PHYSICAL SECURITY

### Introduction

In elections, physical security refers to standards, procedures, and actions taken to protect voting systems and related facilities and equipment from natural and environmental hazards, tampering, vandalism, and theft. Physical security safeguards are required for voting systems in storage, in transit, in the polling place, and in use on Election Day through the post-election certified canvass.

Documentation of the election process, from election setup proofing documents to logic and accuracy testing, is the foundation for security in elections. This documentation, required by full-time staff during the pre-election stages and by poll workers on Election Day, provides the audit trail for the election and establishes proof that all components of managing the election were secure at all times. This documentation may also serve as the official court record in the event of a recount or contested election.

This section documents plans, policies, and procedures to manage the various election administration processes and voting system security vulnerabilities. State and county election commissions and municipalities should review these plans, policies, and procedures and consider incorporating them into their local processes.

### Conducting a Security Review

One of the most important proactive steps election officials can take is to conduct an election security review. By walking through procedures, performing physical inspections, and considering all aspects of security, including local information systems security practices, possible threats and vulnerabilities can be identified. An election security review identifies key areas where election officials should take steps to ensure the security and integrity of election administration.

The following activities should be part of an election security review:

- \* Review overall policies to ensure proper separation of job duties throughout the election administration process.
- \* Perform an election administration risk assessment. Identify potential opportunities in the election administration process where election security and integrity is vulnerable to destruction, disruption, tampering, or corruption from internal or external sources. Examples include building fire, power failure, after-hours theft, malfunctioning sprinkler system, misprinted ballots, paper ballots counted twice, bomb scares or terrorist acts, failure of election boards to report for duty, disruptions by voters or poll agents, and so forth. List the potential security exposure and the impact on the election from each threat. Consider whether the likelihood of each threat is high, medium, or low, and develop plans to mitigate or eliminate each threat starting with those considered high.
- \* Review the audit trail from the last election in its entirety. Analyze whether sufficient documentation exists to validate the integrity of the election.
- \* Conduct a debriefing to identify lessons learned about issues and problems encountered in previous elections. This activity should become a regular part of closing out each and every election.
- \* Inventory the list of procedures used throughout the election administration process. Evaluate each procedure to determine whether it needs to be updated based on the security review.
- \* Evaluate the security of the computer systems used in election administration by conducting an information systems security assessment.
- \* Perform a physical security review to assess access and controls of all office and storage facilities used



in the election administration process. Consider the relative security of other agencies sharing the facilities. Evaluate disaster recovery, terrorism, and weather-related considerations, and develop a plan to mitigate such risks. Also consider involving local or State law enforcement agencies.

At no point in the security review allow a person to validate their own security procedures and functions. Use the two-person accountability principle and have the procedures reviewed by someone other than the person who does the work. This objectivity will enhance faith in the integrity and honesty of the review.

**Engage County and Municipal IT Staff.** Elections are, at their core, an information system comprised of processes, people, technology, and data. Engage county and municipal IT staff or local community college or technical school staff to assist in the security review and to help establish and implement applicable election management system security measures. They should be familiar with many of the vulnerabilities and risk management steps related to information systems and can be of valuable assistance. Include county or municipal IT staff or local community college or technical school staff early on in the process and on a continuing basis.

**Review Equipment Storage, Logistics, and Maintenance.** The election administration security risks associated with voting systems equipment go beyond the obvious concerns of theft and destruction. Everything from building security, access control, and configuration management of the voting system equipment is an important component in the overall election security.

- \* Perform a physical security review to assess access and controls of the facility in which the voting systems equipment is stored and maintained. Maintain a key control list of all personnel with keys and access to the facilities. Maintain an access log including sign in and sign out dates and times of all personnel, including visitors.
- \* Implement two-person integrity security measures when setting up the voting system equipment for an election. Never allow a voting system vendor or employee to have uncontrolled access of county election equipment storage and maintenance facilities.
- \* Take into consideration long-term storage and security needs when designing storage and workspace.

- \* Implement an effective asset management and inventory control system for all components of the voting system. Consider testing procedures and sign off on all equipment returned from the vendor after maintenance to ensure proper versions of the equipment hardware, software, and firmware.
- \* Nongovernment officials should never be allowed to have unattended or unmonitored access to stored voting equipment. Government election officials should be responsible for maintaining the access log and supervising the activity.

#### Steps to take when conducting an election security review:

- \* Create or update the master election audit trail checklist to ensure it identifies all required audit trail documents for an election.
- \* Review all election audit trail checklists to ensure they incorporate two-person integrity security measures such as dual sign-off.
- \* Review election commission work areas to ensure office space is appropriately isolated and undetected access by unauthorized individuals is not possible.
- \* Review voting equipment storage and work areas to ensure only authorized personnel have access.
- \* Review the list of personnel who have keys to election office work areas and voting equipment storage to ensure all keys are accounted for and only authorized personnel have keys. Eliminate the distribution of master keys or key cards. Instead, issue access keys or key cards to personnel based on job duties and responsibilities, ensuring that individual staff members do not have the ability to enter the office and access the voting system undetected.
- \* Review chain-of-custody procedures, the use of tamper-evident seals, and inventory control/asset management processes to ensure voting units and associated equipment are properly and securely controlled and are accounted for throughout the election administration process.

#### Steps to follow for reviewing equipment storage, logistics, maintenance, and security procedures:

- \* Ensure physical, tamper-evident seals are employed throughout the election administration process.

- \* Review storage and maintenance facility property insurance to ensure coverage is appropriate and adequate.
- \* Review inventory control/asset management processes.
- \* Create or update appropriate procedures to ensure absentee and emergency ballot blank paper stock are controlled at all times.
- \* Review other facilities shared with voting equipment storage, logistics, and maintenance for potential security vulnerabilities.
- \* Develop physical security procedures and safeguards to document the controlled physical access to voting systems and the facility or facilities where they are housed.
- \* Document all security related repairs and modifications to the physical components of the facility where voting systems are stored (i.e., walls, doors, locks, cameras, alarm systems, etc.).

### Security—Personnel

Another important factor in determining the vulnerability of a system is the people involved; it is they who must implement security policies and procedures and defend against any attacks.

- \* Qualification guidelines should be established for choosing the person(s) for operating and administering (creating databases, defining ballots, testing, and maintaining equipment) the voting system.
- \* Perform background checks on election officials authorized to define and configure elections and maintain voting devices to minimize the risk of election tampering.
- \* Custodians of voting machines must be fully competent, thoroughly trained, and sworn to perform their duties honestly and faithfully.
- \* Develop a detailed “Rules of Security Behavior” sign-off sheet for all levels of personnel responsible for using the voting system (election director, chief judges, poll workers, rovers, field technicians, etc.) and maintain a copy of the signed forms on file.
- \* Establish policies and procedures for visitors and observers. At minimum, these procedures should include employee-monitored entrances and exits with a sign-in/sign-out log and issuance of a numbered visitor badge to be worn at all times.

To effectively manage a polling location on Election Day, establish the number of personnel needed and their duties.

- \* Maintain separation of duties for poll managers to provide “checks and balances” during the election process.
- \* Incorporate two-person integrity security measures to polling place procedures.
- \* Provide adequate security of election equipment at the polling place at all times.

### Security—Paper Ballots

Protecting the security of paper ballots is also a component of providing physical security. Election administrators should have a documented plan in place to provide for the management of optical scan or paper ballots, ballot-on-demand ballots, and all ballot stock. This plan should include details pertaining to the audit trail and chain of custody for the ballots with strict control over the ballots and ballot stock at all time.

- \* The security of paper ballots includes security in the election office facility and at the polling place on Election Day. At least two election officials should oversee all processes, including the transfer of ballots and other election materials from the polling place to the central office.
- \* Two or more staff members should receive the ballot order and verify the accuracy and quantity of ballots against the ballot order request. Once validated, the ballots should be stored in a secure building with restricted access in a secure area.
- \* Ballot-on-demand is often used to supplement printed ballot stock. If used, election officials should implement internal controls to safeguard ballot stock from fraudulent or inappropriate use. For example:
  - \* Two or more election officials should monitor, record, and balance daily ballot-on-demand activity.
  - \* Election officials should reconcile the number of blank ballots received from the vendor, the number printed or spoiled, and the number of unused ballots.



## Security—Voting Equipment and Peripheral Devices

### Voting Equipment Storage (Warehousing/Staging Facility) and Inventory Control

Physical security of all voting system equipment and peripheral devices must be maintained at all times. The security measures should include the following:

- \* Maintain complete and accurate inventory of all voting system equipment. This includes voting devices, optical scanners, communication equipment, supervisor or administrator devices, ballot activation devices, and storage media.
- \* Assign personnel the responsibility of maintaining accurate inventory.
- \* Provide physical access control to the storage facility only to authorized personnel. Following is a list of recommendations:
  - \* Make sure all personnel have signed security agreements on file.
  - \* Each staff member should be issued a unique code for entry and exit tracking. Staff members should wear identification badges at all times.
  - \* All visitors, vendors, and maintenance personnel should be authenticated through the use of appointments and identification checks in order to gain access to the voting system equipment.
- \* If video cameras are used, schedule regular checks to verify they are fully operational.
- \* Change keys or combinations on locks as necessary for each election.

It is recommended that the following information regarding the voting system equipment be tracked:

- \* Equipment—Maintain a list of equipment, serial numbers, and quantity in the storage facility.
- \* Machine Checkout—Maintain a list of voting system equipment that has been released from the storage facility.
- \* Usage History—Maintain a history of elections for which each voting device has been used.
- \* Repair History—Maintain a history of repairs to individual voting devices.

Inventory control should consist of tracking the voting system equipment when it is being—

- \* Released and returned for any official election.

- \* Released and returned for any demonstration of an election.
- \* Accepted from or returned to the vendor (including warranty and maintenance repairs).

A barcoding system should be explored as a method for tracking the location of voting system equipment. All electronic media, regardless of type (memory packs, compact flash cards, PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card International Association) cards, voter card encoders, supervisor cards, and key cards) should be *permanently* identified with a unique serial number. The serial numbers should be recorded as part of the internal inventory audit trail.

A "Voting Equipment Delivery Sheet" should be used to record and track equipment delivery information, description of equipment (including serial numbers), and signatures of equipment handlers or recipients.

### Voting Equipment Storage (Warehousing/Staging Facility)—Access Control

- \* Voting devices must be kept in a locked (secured) facility.
- \* Access to the storage facility should be restricted to only authorized personnel. Access should be restricted through the use of badges, door entry access devices, and monitoring systems. The best method of access control is one that uniquely identifies the person, authorizes entry, and logs the date and time of access.
- \* The storage facility should be equipped with monitored security and fire alarm protection.
- \* For additional security, the facility could be monitored by video cameras.

Consider the following questions:

- \* What procedures are in place to assure the physical security of voting machines and paper ballots before an election?
- \* How and where are equipment, ballots, and ballot stock stored? How is the facility secured against theft, tampering, and vandalism?
- \* What protections are in place to assure access is permitted only for authorized personnel?
- \* Who installs equipment upgrades, a county official or a vendor?

- \* Do vendors ever handle any voting equipment?
- \* If vendors are allowed to handle voting equipment pre-election, are county officials required to be present?
- \* Has the physical security of the voting equipment, ballots, and other election material been protected against terrorism and other "Homeland Security" issues?

### Security—Election Process

#### Securing the Voting Devices During Preparation and Transport to Precinct

- \* The voting devices should be secured with tamper-proof numbered seals. Access to the voting devices' power control and election results storage media should be secured (controlled) within the voting device. The serial number of all seals should be recorded for verification during precinct setup.
- \* It is recommended that for each voting device, records are kept of the following:
  - The serial number of the voting device.
  - The serial number of all seals used to secure the voting device for delivery.
  - The number registered on the protective counter.
  - The serial number of the seal used to secure the voting device after the polls have closed.
- \* Develop an operational plan defining what will be delivered, where, by whom, and when. Use delivery sheets to keep track of the exact polling place each voting device is delivered to.
- \* It is strongly recommended that the auxiliary voting equipment and supplies (ballot activation devices, administrator devices, communication equipment, seals for poll closing, etc.) remain in the possession of election officials until the opening of the polls on Election Day. If the voting devices are delivered to the polling location before Election Day, they must be secured at the polling location (e.g., cabled together and locked or secured in a locked room). Any other voting equipment or supplies should also be secured. Designated poll manager(s) should verify receipt and sign-off on the delivery of voting devices and necessary election supplies (ballot activation devices, administrator devices, communication equipment, closing seals, etc).

- \* Voting systems should be moved in a controlled transportation mode. In other words, they are locked and sealed in any vehicle or container at the beginning of the transportation and unsealed at the delivery point. Sealing and unsealing should be logged and completed only by election officials.

Consider the following questions:

- \* Are voting equipment and ballots transported to polling places by county officials or poll workers?
- \* How and when are voting equipment and ballots transported to the polling places?
- \* If poll workers transport voting equipment and ballots, when do they receive the equipment and ballots? If poll workers receive the voting equipment and ballots significantly in advance of the election, how and where are the materials stored until the election?
- \* Are detailed logs kept of who takes custody of equipment and ballots and those person(s) contact information?
- \* How are voting equipment and ballots secured from tampering from the time they leave election office custody to the time they are delivered to the polling places?
- \* Are serial numbers or other secure, tamper-proof devices or seals placed on all ports where memory cards are inserted?

#### Securing the Voting Devices During Walk-In Absentee/Early Voting

- \* Walk-in absentee voting devices should be prepared, tested, delivered, and set-up in the same manner as voting devices used on Election Day.
- \* The same walk-in absentee voting storage media should be placed in the same voting device every morning and removed every night.
- \* The voting storage media should be secured each night in a tamper-proof location, preferably within the election office.
- \* Voting devices should be closed, sealed, and secured at the end of each day. The number on all protective seals and public counters should be recorded. In addition, seals and counters should be verified before the voting devices are used for voting the next morning.

### Securing the Voting Devices During Mobile Absentee/Early Voting

- \* Mobile absentee voting devices should be prepared, tested, delivered, and set up in the same manner as voting devices used on Election Day.
- \* Voting devices should be closed, sealed, and secured at the end of each day. The number on all protective seals and public counters should be recorded. In addition, seals and counters should be verified before the voting devices are used for voting the next morning.
- \* The mobile unit containing all voting devices should be returned to the Election Office every evening and stored within a secured facility.

### Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—Precinct Setup

- \* If voting devices and election supplies are delivered to the polling place by anyone other than poll managers, the poll manager(s) should verify the serial numbers of all voting devices and necessary election supplies (ballot activation devices, administrator devices, communication equipment, closing seals, etc.).
- \* Designated poll managers should verify voting device numbers and the numbers of all seals and tamper-resistant tape on all voting devices and inspect the voting devices for evidence of tampering. This should be a two-person integrity security process and all poll managers should sign-off on this validation.
- \* Voting devices setup should be as follows:
  - Access to the voting devices' power control, counter controls, and election results storage media must be controlled within the voting device and inaccessible to the voter.
  - Voting devices exterior should be in plain view of the poll managers at all times.
- \* Poll managers should maintain control of all administrator and ballot activation devices.

Consider the following questions:

- \* How are poll workers trained to be alert for signs of pre-election tampering?
- \* How are poll workers trained to respond if tampering is suspected or discovered?

### Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—Opening the Polls

- \* Poll managers should activate each voting device, including the following:
  - Verify date and time and precinct on the voting devices.
  - Verify the protective seals and public counters on the voting devices.
  - Verify that the electronic paper audit trail is functioning.
- \* Poll managers should secure administrator devices and communication equipment during the day.
- \* The poll manager and all poll workers should sign-off on a checklist to verify all opening procedures were followed.

### Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—Voting

- \* The area around the voting devices must be secure at all times. Only poll managers, legally authorized personnel, and registered voters should be allowed in the voting device area. A voter should not be allowed to enter this area until a voting device is available for his or her use.
- \* Each poll worker should have a clearly defined role so voters are able to clearly identify them and their particular responsibilities as they move through the polling place.
- \* Provisional voters should be directed to a separate check-in table or area. This assures that provisional ballots are handled uniformly and also establishes ballot accountability for auditing purposes.
- \* The poll manager must maintain control of the ballot style identification device (card, slip, tag, label, ticket) and the ballot activation device.
- \* Poll managers should periodically inspect the voting devices for any damage or tampering and to ensure the device is powered by electricity.
- \* Poll managers should perform periodic verification of the number of voters processed to the number of votes recorded (public counter) on the voting devices and balance that number to the total number of signatures in the poll book.

Consider the following questions:

- \* Are poll workers trained to ensure that voter lines form at the registration table and not at the voting



devices, especially during periods of heavy volume?

- \* Are poll workers trained to issue a voting activation card to a voter only when a voting station is available for use?
- \* Are “troubleshooters” available to visit and roam polling places on Election Day to provide support to poll workers?

#### Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day— Poll Closing

- \* Poll managers should validate that the number of ballot activation devices and voter activation cards issued to the polling place are collected and secured in a transport case for return to the local election office.
- \* The voting devices should be secured using the numbered “closing” seal. The signed affidavit should be returned by a poll manager to the local election office with the number of the closing seal, number voting devices, number of the public and protective counter, and the voting precinct recorded on the envelope.

#### Securing the Voting Devices During Tallying

- \* At the end of the day, print out end-of-day vote totals from each individual voting device and deliver the printed tapes to the local election office in a secure manner.
- \* The election result storage media from all voting devices within the polling location should be accounted for and reconciled.
- \* The election result storage media and printed tape(s) should be secured in a numbered, sealed pouch and transported from the polling place to the local election office or designated collection point.
- \* If transmitting unofficial election results by modem, (1) print end-of-day vote totals from each device, (2) limit access control to the telecommunication devices, (3) enable modem access only when uploads are expected, and (4) apply sufficient encryption and verification of data to protect the transmission of vote tallies.
- \* Establish procedures to securely transport election results from optical scanners to vote tabulation computers if the optical scanners are located in a different location from where the vote tabulation takes place.

#### Security the Voting Devices During Tabulation at the Election Office

- \* Election officials should perform a verification of results transmitted by modem to the county election office through a separate count of the election result storage media containing the original votes cast.
- \* The offices where the vote tabulation is being conducted must be secure. Do not allow unauthorized and unescorted personnel to be in contact with the tabulation equipment. Only authorized election officials should be allowed in the tabulation equipment room.
- \* Consider the use of video monitoring to secure the vote tabulation area.
- \* Consider uniformed security or police officers to secure the ballot room and voting equipment.

#### Consider the following questions:

- \* Are all paper ballots and electronic election media in the possession of at least two election officials or poll workers (using the two-person accountability principle) during its transport to the central or remote count locations?
- \* Is the election tabulation process secure by protecting the premises where the vote tabulation is being conducted? Are unauthorized and unescorted personnel allowed to be in contact with the tabulation equipment?
- \* What physical security measures have been implemented for the room containing the computer running the tabulation software?
- \* Are printed result tapes and a backup copy of the tabulations in locked storage in a secure location?
- \* Is there a complete chain of custody with two-person integrity security measures for all election materials?

#### Securing the Voting Devices During Transport to Storage

- \* Only designated personnel should transport voting devices to the local storage facility. Custodians of the voting devices should verify receipt of all devices, confirm that the devices have not been tampered with during transport, and sign-off on the receipt of the voting devices.

- \* Only designated personnel should transport election supplies (administrator devices, ballot activation devices, communication equipment, etc.) to the local election office. A local election official should verify receipt and sign-off on the delivery of the election supplies.

#### Securing the Voting Devices During Storage and Post-Election

- \* Local election officials should maintain an inventory of election materials. These materials should be securely stored until the period of election protest and appeals has ended.

Election materials include the following:

- Voting devices (including memory cards where applicable).
- Administrator and ballot activation devices.

- Seal envelopes.
  - Voter registration (poll) lists.
  - Election result tapes and printouts.
  - Field supervisor and rover reports.
  - Poll worker daily logs.
  - Reconciliation reports.
  - Audit data (includes retention of the completed master election audit trail checklist mentioned on page 16).
  - Voting Equipment Delivery Sheets (mentioned on page 29).
- \* Two copies of the inventory list should exist; one list should remain stored with the election materials and one list should be kept at the local election office. The local election official should verify and sign the inventory list.


SPATIAL ASSESSMENT FOR  
**MONROE COUNTY, IN**  
**ELECTION CENTRAL**

A REVIEW OF EXISTING SPACE USAGE

PREPARED BY:

LA+D

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**Monroe County Election Central  
Facility Spatial Analysis**  
November, 20 2021

LA+D visited the existing Election Central offices on 10/28/21 to assess the current space usage of the Monroe County Election Central entity. Following the site assessment, LA+D generated three conceptual floor plan options which illustrate possible modifications to the existing facility. If incorporated, these modifications will help maintain voter integrity in future elections in the following ways:

1. Improve the voter "flow" through the space from the time they wait in line to vote, until the time they exit after voting.
2. Maintain confidentiality and privacy for voting.
3. Improve handling and storage of ballots to avoid any possible disputes
4. Consolidating all operations and storage to one facility
5. Provide staff and workers with proper working space for efficient workflow and reduced labor costs

The three plan options presented alter the building as follows:

1. One option takes a minimal approach to building modifications and simply shows renovations which could occur within the existing suite to improve the facility.
2. The second option shows Election Central occupying the entire first floor
3. The third option shows Election Central occupying the entire building

The Election Central Facility Spatial Program is broken down into the following components and we have studied these components with the board officials to determine the proper space allotment based on operations. Following is an assessment which compares "existing" sizes of programmatic elements to "Programmatic Square footages which meet operational demands". These proper sizes can then be reviewed against what we have indicated in the three plan options for the building.

The charts on the following pages provide information relative to the assessment. Some notable differences between the existing footprint of the facility and the proposed footprint include the following. The identification area in the existing can serve approximately 22 people during voting events. An expanded identification area could allow up to 82 people to be served (room for staff to process voters while also allowing voters to practice social distancing).

The voting area itself can be expanded from 24 voters (which have been packed tightly into the existing space) to up to 50 voters. The new arrangement creates more space between voters and also creates an environment where voter privacy can be maintained, thereby protecting the integrity of the election process.

The ballot room in the existing facility is nearing capacity. It is noted that due to a lack of on-site storage, this room is being used to store various paper products in addition to the ballots. In the proposed, expanded building footprint, this room is expanded to allow for growth within the county and for better organization of ballots within the space. Misc, general storage is moved out of this room into other dedicated storage rooms within the building.

The "Back Room" in the existing space is currently being used for staff to work and to take calls while at the same time being used as a conference room. At times, sensitive information is shared in meetings while call staff takes calls within earshot of the meeting table. The IT and server equipment is also housed directly within this room. The proposed, expanded footprint building separates IT/server items into a dedicated

room. Three different types of work rooms are provided, giving staff necessary privacy to maintain confidentiality within the voting process.

During the voting times, the number of staff can grow significantly and the existing open office area size is inadequate to house the required number of staff. The proposed footprint provides a second floor open office concept with cubicles for call-staff to take phone calls in privacy, away from meeting spaces and ballot counting. Additional closed office spaces are also provided for staff who require privacy even away from the cubicle area.

The existing plan does not have dedicated meeting space and the new plan provides three different sizes of meeting rooms. These rooms can also be considered multi-purpose spaces, allowing for staff overflow during the busy voting times.

Lastly, the existing break room only accommodates 4 to 5 people at one time (maximum). When voting occurs, the demand on this room is approximately 30 people at a time. The proposed, expanded building footprint accommodates 30 people in a break room. Providing staff with proper areas for breaks can promote productivity and fosters a more positive work environment.

We have concluded in our assessment that in order to reach proper size allocations, it will be necessary for Election Central to fully occupy the full, existing building (both floors), which puts the total size of the facility at 12,974 sq ft. (expanded to this area from the existing 3,784 sq ft suite). Off site storage will be brought to this facility and all voting-related items will be housed under one roof. Second floor storage areas can keep sensitive material safe from any type of flooding event and ultimately will serve to protect the integrity of the election process in Monroe County.

Existing Programmatic Element square footages:

Ceiling height is 10ft in all volumetric calculations.

ROOM	FUNCTION	CAPACITY @ PEAK	AREA (In Square Feet)	VOLUME (In Cubic Feet)
Vestibule	Entry Point, Information Wall, Wayfinding notes	10	114 sqf	1140 cu ft
Voter Registration Area	Register in person, Orientation	12	325 sqf	3250 cu ft
Identification Area	Verify ID	22	330 sqf	3300 cu ft
Check-out Area w/ Scan	Last check point before leaving	8	103 sqf	1680 cu ft
Printing Area	Print ballots to vote on, printing equipment	13	282 sqf	3620 cu ft
Voting Area	Voting area, Voting equipment	24	780 sqf	7800 cu ft
Open Office Area	Office cubicles, Desks and folder cabinets	6	278 sqf	2780 cu ft
Ballot Room	Ballot storage, Cabinets for storage	2	173 sqf	1730 cu ft
Back Room	Counting ballots, Primary working space	10	558 sqf	5580 cu ft
Closed Office	Executive office space	1	156 sqf	1560 cu ft
Staff Meeting Room	Non-existent in this plan			
Conference Rm	Non-existent in this plan			
Break Room	Staff lounge area	4	170 sqf	1700 cu ft
IT & Server Area	Computer system servers, IT (Not in an enclosed room, this plan)	na	102 sqf	1020 cu ft
Mechanical Room	Doesn't appear to be a dedicated mechanical room for this plan	na		
Storage Room	Store various equipment	na	13 sqf	130 cu ft
Restroom		1	46 sqf	460 cu ft
Total Area - Existing			3784 sq ft	37,840 cu ft

Programmatic Square footage required to meet operational demands

ROOM	FUNCTION	CAPACITY @ PEAK	TOTAL AREA (In Square Feet)	TOTAL VOLUME (In Cubic Feet)
Vestibule	Entry Point, Information Wall, Wayfinding Wall	18	180 sqf	1800 cu ft
Voter Registration Area	Register in person, Wait to register, Orientation	14	362 sqf	3100 cu ft
Identification Area	Verify ID	82	1221 sqf	12210 cu ft
Check-out Area w/ Scan	Checkout	35	422 sqf	4220 cu ft
Printing Area	Print ballots	19	367 sqf	3670 cu ft
Voting Area	Voting area, Voting equipment	50	2156 sqf	21560 cu ft
Private Office	Executive office	6	600 sqf	6000 cu ft
Open Office Area	Office cubicles, Desks and folder cabinets	43	1985 sqf	19850 cu ft
Back Room	Counting ballots, Primary working room	17	754 sqf	7540 cu ft
Staff Meeting Room	Small room for small meetings	10	183 sqf	1830 cu ft
Ballot Room	Ballot storage	6	868 sqf	8680 cu ft
Conference Room	Large meetings	30	465 sqf	4650 cu ft
Break Room	Break room for staff	30	547 sqf	5470 cu ft
IT & Server Room	Computer system servers, IT	na	187 sqf	1870 cu ft
Mechanical Rom	HVAC equipment	na	134 sqf	1340 cu ft
Storage Room	Consolidated Storage from all sites	na	148 sqf	1480 cu ft
Restroom		10	821 sqf	8210 cu ft
Total Area Proposed			12,974 sq ft	129,740 cu ft






ELECTION  
CENTRAL

PARTIAL  
FIRST FLOOR  
REMODEL

LEAH ARCHITECTURE &  
LCAID  
1001 STATE STREET, SUITE 200  
HERNDON, VA 20151



FIRST FLOOR  
PLAN

A1.1

**SYMBOL LEGEND**


	ROOM NAME AS SHOWN		REFERENCE NOTE
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	NOT USED		FINISH LOCATION AS SHOWN
	WALL SECTION AS SHOWN		ELEVATION LOCATION AS SHOWN
	DETAIL LOCATION		FINISH OR ELEVATION
	ISOLATED DOOR		ISOLATED DOOR

- FLOOR PLAN GENERAL NOTES**
1. REFER SHEET 21 TO PROJECT GENERAL NOTES.
  2. OWNER TO APPROVE ALL FINISHES PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION.
  3. DO NOT SCALE DIMENSIONS, EXCEPT AS NOTED OTHERWISE.
  4. FINISHES TO BE SHOWN ON THIS PLAN ARE TO BE USED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. FINISHES TO BE USED IN ALL AREAS NOT SHOWN ON THIS PLAN ARE TO BE USED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
  5. REFER TO CIVIL, ARCHITECTURAL, STRUCTURAL, PLUMBING, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTRICAL DRAWINGS FOR FINISHES, MATERIALS, AND CONSTRUCTION METHODS.
  6. ALL CONTRACTORS ARE REQUIRED TO MEET THE STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESSIBILITY AND TO BE COMPLIANT WITH THE AMERICAN WITH Disabilities Act (ADA).
  7. FINISHES TO BE SHOWN ARE FROM THE FACE OF THE CONCRETE SLAB, ETC.
  8. ALL WALLS ARE TO BE BUILT TO BOTTOM OF STRUCTURE UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
  9. FINISHES TO BE SHOWN ARE TO BE USED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
  10. ALL INTERIORS FINISHES TO BE CLASSIC TRIMMINGS UNLESS NOTED OTHERWISE.
  11. CONTRACTOR TO FOLLOW MANUFACTURER'S WRITTEN APPLICATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL FINISHES.
  12. PROVIDE SMOOTH LINE TRANSITION BETWEEN ALL FLOOR FINISHES UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
  13. WHERE INTERIORS FINISHES ARE TO BE USED, CONTRACTOR TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO ALL EXISTING FINISHES TO BE PROTECTED.
  14. PROVIDE FINISHES TO BE SHOWN UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
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  30. FINISHES TO BE SHOWN UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

FLOOR PLAN REFERENCE NOTES:

1. FOR USER.

**GENERAL NOTE:**  
ALL CONTRACTORS SHALL PROVIDE PROTECTION OF EXISTING WORK AND SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL EXISTING WORK. CONTRACTOR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL EXISTING WORK AND SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL EXISTING WORK. CONTRACTOR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL EXISTING WORK AND SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL EXISTING WORK.



EXISTING ELECTION  
CENTRAL SPACE  
3,784 SQ. FT.

FIRST FLOOR PLAN  
3/16" = 1'-0"







